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s Subsequent courts have extended &hat holding 
of Worker-Management Relations Panel on Private 
s, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 1996, at 5 (noting a dramatic 
ee the  Gilmer decision in 2991); Margaret A. Jacobs, 
keptical of Arbrtration, W& ST. J., Dec. 22, 1994, at 
592 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW fiEVEEW I1997 
contracts with existing employees and prospective hires.' 
Employers have mbraced these agreements, haping that 
arbitration will deliver what it promises: inexpensive and speedy 
decisionmaking, finality, and confiden~iality.%oreover, many 
employers are convinced that together with providing a more 
expeditious, less expensive system of justice, arbitration will 
improve their bettam line by lowering potential damage awards." 
Employers' enthusiasm fox the perceived benefits af inserting 
arbitration clauses into employment agreements, together with 
the judicial approval of these cia use^,^ ensures the continued use 
of such agreements in the nonunionized workplace,* 
4. See, e.g., Mrgo v. Shearson b h m a n  Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 
1992); Willia v. Dean Witter T(eyno1ds, Inc,, 948 P.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991). 
5. See Note, Mandatary Arbitration of Statutory En~ployrnent Dzsputes, 109 
HARV. L REV. 1670, 1673 (1986). 
6. See 0. Mathimon, Eualuating a d  Using Emplyer-initiated Arbitration 
Poltctrrv aiid &reentent$: Preparing the Workplace for the Xwetzty-first Century. in 
E W I ~ W N T  DJSCRLMMATION AND CIVIL RLCH'E ACTIONS ZM FEDERAL AND STAI'E COURTS, 
793,795 (ALX-ABA Course of Study, Feb. 22, 1996). available in Westlaw, C A M  ALE- 
ABA 393 ('{Edmployers faced with the potential of castly employment-relabd 
lawsnib . . . have been weighing alternative meam of resolving such disputes in place 
of trial by jury.']; Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the 
Suprerr~e Court's Preference for Birding Arbitration, 74 W ~ r r .  U. L.Q. 684 C1996); 
Patricia Sturdevant & Dwight Galnnn, Sbuld Bindug Arbitrat~on Clauses be 
Pmhrbited m Cansunwr Contracts?, D m .  RicSOi,. MAG., Summer 1994, at 4-5 (stating 
t h t  companies use arbitration clauws ta avoid juries, among other thingsi. However, 
tittle. empirical svidence has been gathered ta support the notion that arbitration 
fotvers damage awards. 
7. See Gilrner, 500 U.S, 20; Patterson v. 'renet Healthcare Inc., 113 F.3d 832 
(8th Cir. 1997); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sw. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
8. Although employers have used Gilrner as a justification for insertion o f  
arbitration agreemen& in contracts d employment, that decision may be premature. 
Ono controversial issue Gilmer did not addreus was whether $ 1 d t h e  Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) ineludes within ita covernge agresme~rts  to arbitrate statutory 
claim betweon wnptayem a n d  ertrployees. The FAA was designed to place arbi t rat ion 
agrcemenb on quad fmting with any other contract. See 9 U.S.C. Q 2 (1994). Yet 5 1 
af tlm FAA limits the FAA's coverage, stating that "nothing herein contained shall 
apply to contraota sf employment af seamen, rdlmad employees, or any other c l a s s  sf 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. 5 1. The Gilmer Court did not  
reach the issue whether 8 1 excludee from it6 coverage contracts of employment 
bctween employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce, because the 
contract in Qilmr was between Gilmar and the New York S k k  Exchange, not Gilnler 
and his employer. If 8 1 excludee contracts of enqdoyment fmm its coverage, those 
contmcte will be urhenforceaMs unless etate law indicates othenvise. See Ware, supra 
note 3, a t  94-95. While Gilrmr did not address the B 1 isaus, many other courts have. 
See Cldc, 105 F.3d at 1471 (stating that '(every circuit to consider this issue squarerr 
hm found that section I of tkre FAA exempts only the employment contracts of workers 
actually engaged in the movement of goo& in intemhte oommerce"). Because the vast 
m.ajarity d courts have held that I 1 of the FAG excludes from its coverage only the! 
contracta of employment of workera actually involved in transporting goads, it seems 
A certain inevitability surrounded the emergence of 
arbitration as a preferred method for resolving employment 
disputes in the nonunionized sector. After all, arbitration had 
long been the preferred means for resolving employment 
disputes in  the unionized workplaceg Perhaps it was  the 
extraordinary szlccess of arbitration in resolving disputes in the 
sector that  precipitated nonunionized employers' 
adoption of arbitration t o  resolve their own ever-increasing 
numbor of employment disputes. Whatever the reason for its 
increased use, arbitration of employment disputes in the 
nonunionized sector is here to stay. 
Although arbitration originated in organized labor and 
csmmercisrl settings, in at  least one respect, nonunionized 
arbitration has developed more rapidly than arbitration in the 
unionized sector." W i l e  Gilrner approved the use of predispute 
agreements to  arbitrate discrimination claims in the 
noxlukonized workplace, the use of such agreements is nat 
permitbd in the unionized world because of the 1974 Supreme 
Court docision in Alexander u. Gardner-Denver.ll In Gardner- 
Dmwuer, the issue was whether an unionized employee, who, as 
required by his union's collective bargaining agreement, had 
submitted his ciaim under the agreement's nondiscrimination 
clause to  h a 1  arbitration, retained the right to bring a Title VII 
claim in federal court following the arbitration. The Court 
determined that an unionized employee's right to a trial de novo 
an  a Title VEI claim is not precluded by prior submission of a 
cIaim to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement's 
nondiscrimination clause.12 
The continued viability of Gardner-Denver follawing Gilmer 
remains an open question, at least in cases where the parties 
expressly agree to abide by antidiscrimination laws. Gilmer 
superficially addressed Gardner-Denver's continuing validity in 
response t o  CriImer's argument tha t  statutory claims could not be 
unlikely that the Supreme Court rvould reverse direction and exclude such contracts 
from the FAA's coverage. 
9. See Thomas J. Pjskarski and David 8. floss, Private Arbifrution as fhe 
Bdwive Means of Resolving Emplgyrnent-Related Disputes, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 205, 
209 {1993). 
nemliy Note, Compulsory Arbitration in the Unionized Workplace: 
Gardner-Denver and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 37 B.C. 
court and several 
13. See GiBmer v. InbnstaWJohnsorz Lane Corp., 800 U.S. 20 (1991). 
14. See id. at 33. 
15, See Mart;in A. Mralin, RrbEtmtcng Stat~tury Eraployment C la~ns  in the 
Af&L.rrr&ath of Gitrner, 40 ST, UUIS U. L.J. 77, 84 (1996). 
16, See Austin v. Owens-Brwkway Glass Container Inc., 78 P.3d 875 (4th Cir.) 
(enforcing irxeecutury arbika~on agreement In collective bargaining context), cert. 
denied, 151 S. Ct. 432 (1996); Bright 7. Narsbipco & Norfblk Shipbuilding & Drydock 
Carp., 951 F, Sup, 95 (E.D. Va. 1997); Brummetk v. Gopaz Packing Corp., 954 F. 
Supp. 180 {S.D. Ohio 1996); .Jessie v, Csl-ter Health Care Center, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 
1174, 1176-74 IE.B. Ky. 1991961 (foliewing Austin). 
17. 38 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.). 
18. Sea td. at 882, 
19. Fd. at 880-82. 
20. See Kevin P. McGowm, Labor t a w :  Size of Award Still Largely Determined 
by Stade Law, Say AN"urne9 on A84 Panel, I19961 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at 
I)-16 (Aug. 13, 19%); Richard C. huben, Mandcstopy Arbitration Ckauses Under Fire, 
82 A.R.A. J. 58 (1996). 
s Is inconsistent wit& the 
ility of arbitration 
er judicial decisions.21 
rdner-Denver, while 
Denver's facts, is no 
es have agreed to 
&Gon of employment, to sign a predispute arbitration 
er;~nestt foregoing all access to jury trials, is enforceable, then 
the "Ga~drter-Denver apeement," an agreement between the 
union and employer to arbitrate employees' claims, must be 
enforceable, This article uses a game theoretic analysis 
that there is actually greater reason to enforce 
"Calrdner-Denver aseements" than "Gilmer agreements." Game 
theoq demonstrates that the structural protections inherent in 
t h  co:allective bargaining ca text cannot be duplicated in cases 
inva;lving agreements to a itrate individual statutory claims. 
Thus, this article contends that even if Gilmer is ultimately 
owcrtunn~d,2~ "Gardner-Denver agreements" should remain 
eaforcearble. 
mer, the Court compelled arbitration of Gilmer's age 
n claim because he had signed a predispute 
lmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 US. 20 (1991); 
r Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 477 (1989); Rodriguez de Quijas 
ss 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass 
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against 
itration Agreements between Employers and Employees, 
(arguing that Gflmer should be overturned). 
Gikmer has prompted commentato 
he aftermath of 
23, Cilrner also argued, among other things, that arbitral procedures were 
Enwufficient to protect his rights, Gilmer cldmed that the arbitrators were biased i n  
favor o f  the employer, and that the llrnitod discovery available was insufXicient a s  was 
the tack of written opinions. See Gi l r e r ,  500 U.S. a t  30-31 
24, 346 US,  427 (19531, reu'd, Rodr~guez, 490 US, at. 481. In Wilko, the Court  
hold that rt predispute agreement to arbitrate a claim arising under 5 12(2) of the 
Stqu~tiee Act was unenformable bcause a judicial forum was necessary to protect t h e  
substantive rights created by the Securitiee Act on behalf of investors. The Wilko 
court's decision rested prim&Iy on its belief that arbitration was inadequate to enforce 
statutory rights. Thus, where the arbitral forum provides insufficient protection t o  
stututary rights, W h o  commands that the statute'e beneficiaries be permitted to mess  
a judicial forum. Since the 198Os, however, the Court has never found the arrbitral 
forum an inadequate venue for vindication of statutory rights. 
26. See Ciilmer, 500 US. a t  33. It is mrprising that the Court did not use Gilmer 
to reconsider Gardner-Denver. It seems counterlntuitive that Galtner should endorse, 
enforcement of arbitration apwments  between parties with disparate negotiating 
incentlvesd~nployertl and employees-while it  continues, following Gardner-Denver, 
to reject wholesale the agreements reached by parties with similar negotiating 
incentives-unions and empioyers. Without &&fieant consideration, the Gitmer Court ,  
and the majority of esutfg ~ddressing this question since OElmer, rest the decision no t  
to enforce the ccailective preference of a unionized workforce on Gardner-Denver's 
holding that statutory employment claims are independent from a collective bargaining 
iigr-reement's arbitration procedure. This issue will be considered in meater deo th  in  
P& HI af this article, 
- " 
26. See Btisentine v. Stone & Webshr En& Corp., 117 P.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Hurrlsun v. Eddy Potash, Xnc., 112 F.3d 1437 (Nth Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply 
Co., 109 F A  354, 363-64 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Michele Hoyman and Lamont E. 
Shlkwod,  Tke Arbitration of Di8crimiwtion Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner- 
Denver, 39 &D. J, 49 (1984) (calling for Gardner-Denver's reversal long before Gilrner 
was decided); Malin, supra note 15. 
27. See, s,g,, Brisentinu, 117 F.3d at  522-23; fliarrisor~, 112 F.Sd a t  1437; Pryner, 
109 Fa% 354; Thm V. %hn, 54 F.3d 115, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1995); Humphrey v. Council 
at  Gardner-Denver is inconsistent with the 
pslindples Gilrner advoeat therefore, used Gilmer to 
re+?& ~ a r d n e r - D e n v ~ r . ~ ~  rdner-Denver in light of 
r demonstrates that Ialany of the reasons offered in support 
rdner-Denver were wrong when progered; other reasons, 
such as the unsuitability ~f the arbitral forum to resolve 
er correctly state the law. Given the 
changed perception of arbitratio 
justifications for the Gardner-De 
8 ave a p e d  to resolve their claims using external 
antidiscrimination law, Gardn 
2 
Gardner-Denver 
e issues in reach n. The Court's first 
employee's right to a trial de 
be precluded because of his 
an a r b i t ~ a t o r . ~ ~  Second, the 
the adequacy of the arbitral 
ubstitute for litigation.30 hird, in a footnote, the 
the concern that  the interests of the individual 
might be subordinate to those of the group if the union were 
' permitted to waive an employee's right to select a forum.31 
Finally, the Court s sted that an  employee's right to be free 
from racial discrim n is an individual statutory right that 
the union is not authorized to  waive,32 
ses cited supra notes 16-17, 21. 
exander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1974). Unlike Gilrner 
a nonunionized employee's contractual agreement with his employer to 
ula; er to the exhnt 
i t  P oun. inferior b;s l i t iga$i~n 
for the resolution of statuto;osgr daims. Accordin 
Ulnr our recent arbitration cases we ham alrea 
of these a r w m e n t ~  as ins 
stahtov claims. Such gene rbitration ""rs[tl 
on suspidon of arbitrati weakening the 
protections agorded in the substantive law to would-be 
as ouch, they am 'far out of  step with our 
ement of the federal statutes fsvvoring this 
method of resolving 
The Court also stated, "so lo e prospective l i t igant  
effectively may vindicate his or tory cause of action in 
bitsaf forum, the statute will continue to serve its reme 
elrsent function."@* 
Yet the decision in GiZnzer with Gardner-Denuer 's 
theory that; a potential disparity rests between the un ion  
and an employee me a t  subsequent litigation of a s ta tu tory  
claim is permissible. eover, &he Gilrner Court reiterated i t s  
ning arbitration involved contractual, 
Court also espoused the Gardner- 
the union has tho power Lo waive collective 
ividuaal rights.97 Thus, the GiZmer C o u r t  
rdner-Denver remains good law because 
Gilrner involved an express agreement to arbitrate s ta tu tory  
.8. 20, 30 (19919 (quot ing  
er-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 
t h  the existence of a potent ial  
een collective representation a n d  
deviate fmm the interests of 
, the "tension" is based o n  the 
i ts members. Id. Because these 
union acting detrimentally t o  
cern rather than two. 
ent, the grievance a r b i t r a t o r  
e union-management d i spu tes .  
a h  noneontractual disputes and 
ssiat her in resolving the 
eated by the exis ten@ 
grievances. Ind iv idua l  
n representation. 
t&ility t o  waive the collective of its constituents does not 
include the ability to  waive 
ct a forum for the 
rimination claim; (3) 
etween the Interests of the Union and the 
Repmsented Employee is hsignifificant 
0th in Gardner-Denver and later in Gilrner, 
raised the important concern that the union, as labor's exclusive 
representative, might use its power to bargain to the detriment 
of the interests of a certain employee or group of employees.3g 
The theory is that unions might sacrifice individual or protected 
oups' preferences in order to obtain benefits for the majority. 
r court also stated that while Gilmer arose under the FAA, 
not. While it i s  true that courts believe the FAA reflects the 
claims, 
I. Public choice theory s sts that protected graup interesls 
am not compromised 
It i s  entirely possible that protected giroups-those whose i 
rights are protected by antidiscrimination statutes--actually 
receive greater attention and representation from the union than 
does the majority, Unions may be more responsive to the needs 
d classes because they articulate those concerns to 
lo the majority remains silent. 
This is an application of the theory of public choice. 
choice theory involves the application of mieroeconomi 
game theory to le@slative de~isionmaking.~~ ile public choice 
theory has typically focused on the production of law by  
legislators, regulatory agencies and courts, the theory applies 
equally well to any large, elected group that must respond to ids 
constituency. Public choice theorists explain that the 
compromises reached by legislators, as codified in statutes,  
depend, in great part, upon the influence of special interest  
groups. Theoretically, the groups with greatest influence are 
P 
40. See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (recognizing that the union 
is the exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees within the appropriate 
bargaining unit); Bryner, 109 F.3d at 362 PAn agreement negotiated by the union 
elected by a majority of workers in the bargaining unit binds all members of t h e  unit 
. . . ."). 
41, In a grievance procedure, the union represents the aggrieved employee. See 
h&WIN H. MAtM, IND~VIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UN~ON 384 (1988). 8 
42. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of 
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MNN. L. REV. 241, 250 (1992). 
) 
situated  individual^.'^ 
d in organizing due to 
are more "likely t o  
ionate burdens , . . 
predicts that "lots" 
benefits to small 
legislative results 
exists, can be obtained by examination of the analogue to the 
""legislation" produced by the union-the "collective bargaining 
agreement2'-as well as ot er quantifiable union activities, such 
as lobbying. 
The universal inclusion of nondiscrimination clauses in 
collective bargaining apeements would seem to suggest 
protected group capture. So too would the continuing union 
efforts to eliminate sexual di~crimination,~%nd fetal protection 
More ree , union efforts on behalf of the disabled 
culminated in the ge of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, demonstrating the powerful influence of protected groups.48 
43. See id. 
44. Id. at 250-51. Title VII was passed to eliminate disproportionate burdens 
suffered by minorities and to provide then with discrete benefits. 
45. Id. at 251. 
46. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois. 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986): AFSCME 





Risks of marginalization and erasure of protected classes 
unions exist--historically, unions were hardly thought of i 
protector8 of minority rights. Yet even commentators who 
believe that; unions tend to favor majority interests, concede that 
many unions have 'ktteempted to foster er consciousness as 
well as class consciousness through ir organizing and 
pressure stratedes," and that "the labor movement has dsnle 
more than any other social institution to improve women's 
y 
at first blush would s e e m  econamic s d a t ~ s . " ~ ~  Thus unions, 
marc?. likely to marginalize protect ups, may in fact do m u c h  
to advance minority interests. a 
Agplying public choice theory to the operation of unions, one 
would expect to see groups who may suffer disproportionately if 
predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are include 
in collective bargaining ag-mements organizing and using their 
influence to ensure that the union does not concede their right to 
- 
L.J. 219, 220 (1993). x 
49. 443 W.S. 193 (1979). 
60. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
51. Crain, s u m  no& 39, at 2960. But see Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Wailring 
and Defemirg ntle WI Claims, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 779, 796 (1992) (stating that while i 
all employees benefit from unions, unions historically discriminated frequently on the 





i c  choice theory is 
ng is whether the 
pledges of money for re n campaims and public support, 
employees themseifves." 3n order t o  file a representation 
petition, a union must first demonstrate that a substantial 
number of employees support the union,5" 
that at least thirty percent o f  the emplo 
bargaining unit support the union, i t  will call for an electionY In 
Ghat election process, a rival nion can obtain a position on the 
ballot upon the showing sf t e support of just a single 
group decisionmaking, any single person's actions will have an 
on the outcome. As a result, a rational person will try to "fhe-riden 
, in the hope of benefitting from other people's actions. See DANIEL 
IP FRICKEY, LAW AND RJBLIC HOICE 23 (1991). In smaller p u p s ,  
ual's actions will 
of whether the e 
. See Comtel Sys. 
101.18 (1996). N 
during the judicial review process or, before that, substantially 
changed through the Con essional committee system." The 
legismtion so receive a Presidential veto or may b e  
delegated inistrative agency for further 
G tion."' The possibility that proposed legislation will b e  d 
s ally altered or misinterpreted decreases the incentive j- 
of the interest oup to influence the legislation. Yet public: 
choice theory remains a popular method for explaining J 
fedslatian. 
s 
56, See JWS B, A~XBON EVC AL., LABOR R E ~ ~ I O N S  AM) SOCEAL PROBLEMS 146-47 
(19781, 4 
57, See id ,  
58. Once n new union is elected, rival unions are barred from challenging t h e  
incumbeirt union for at leaat twelve months. See 29 U.S.C. 5 159(c)(3) (1994). If the  ri 
incunlbent union neptiaba a b:011wI;ive bargaining agreement that lasts three or more 
years, rivat uniona are bmed &am challenging the incumbent union for three y e w s .  
See LAaoa LAW CASES M D  MATEKIAL~ 279 fArchibaid Cox et al. ede., 1990). 
59, See Jonathan in. Macey, Pub& Choice: The Thory of the Firm and the 3 
Thaoly of itlarkst Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 56 (1988). 
60. See id. at 59. 
s t  in the union setting, the 
atly reduced. A 
slation" in the 
need only concern itself with the 
will change the proposed 
ight subsequently misinterpret 
it, The reviewing court might also commit 
possibility is not s i  ificant because only li 
ie available, While these are real possibilities, the universe of 
potential effects in the union settin is smaller than the 
possibility of altera f le&slation in the legislative process. 
Thus, the protect oups' incentives to influence union 
"legislation" is a t  least as strong as an interest group's incentive 
ta hfluence legislation. 
porting application of public 
een gathered, in at  least one 
e Board recognized the analogies. 
the Board stated that the effect 
ght "cause minorities to coalesce, 
uld lead to collective action with 
oard emphasized 
that given their organization minority groups, 
ng alone, should have the strength to eliminate 
criminatory practices by the 
Applying public choice theory in the union setting, one would 
redict that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims would not 
e included in collective bargaining agreements if the well- 
organized protected groups be1 ed that such agreements were 
nod in their best interest. ause these agreements are 
becoming more frequent rather than less, the protected groups 
may well believe that such agreements are not disadvantageous. 
2. Title Vbl of the Civil ights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination against protected groups 
In the absence of empirical evidence supporting the 
application of public choice theory to union action, concerns that 
the union will prefer majority interests a t  the expense of 
protected groups 
legislative prohctions against union abuse of 
groups. 
decisions are reasonable, courts consider the basis for the union% 4 
decision. If the union's decision is based on "impermissible" or  
"invidious" factors, the union Is held to be in breach of its duty. 
"Impermissible factors" include the members' race, sex, national 
origin, political positions or status as union members. To t he  
extent that most nondiscrimination clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements have been expanded to include other r 
protected statuses, union decisionmaking that relied upon such 
information is likely to be considered a breach as 
Courts hold that the fair representation duty imposes on 
labor unions both the duty not to discriminate and a n  
"affirmative duty t o  take corrective steps to ensure compliance 
with %tie VlII.'767 Thusl the fair representation duty, a t  least i n  
.i 
the context of members' discrimination claims in contract 
negotiation and administration, imposes a significant burden on  
the union to avoid even the appearance of discriminatory 
decisionmaking. 
Some commentabrs criticize judicial analysis o f  the fair  
representation duty, suggesting that the courts' limited judicial 2 
Y 
64. See Vaca v. Sips, 386 US. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffinan, 345 
U.S. 330 (1953). 
65. See Air Line Pilots b s 'n  v+ O'Neili, 499 U.S. 65, 72 (1991); Ryan v. P~nting 1 Pressman Local Ne. 2, 590 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979); Figuema De Arroyo v. Sindicato 
De Trabqjadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970). 
66. See Connye Y. Harper, Origin and Nature of the Duty of Fair Representation, 
12 LAB. L.J. 183, 184-85 (1998). t 
67, Id. at I87 (citing Donne11 v. General Motors Gorp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 
1978)). 
earaingless because i t  is 
ile judicial review of DFR violations is a potential 
vi~lation.~' Moreover, 
p&nciple of distributive fairness should not aflkct the vitality of 
the DFR claim as a eans to limit discrimination against 
protected classes, at least when the union's decision is based on 
an invidious factor. Instead, the good faith duty stands as a bas 
to the union's ability to 
6. Title Vbd protec representation 
were  linsufficient to ensure tha union did not discriminate 
against any of its members, VII provides overlapping 
protection to employees against union discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ~rigin.~%ile the 
union is still occasionally a defendant in a Title VIP action 
68. See Freed e t  al., supra note 39, a t  466. 
69. See id. 
70. In that sense, critics' complaints about the DFR sound very similar to critics' 
emplaints about the business judgment rule in corporate law. The business judgment 
rule i a  a specific application of a directorial standard of conduct to the situation where 
a businem decision is made by disinterested and independent directors on a n  informed 
basis with a good faith belief that the decision will benefit the corporation. Should the 
rsharelrolders sue the directors on the basis that their decision was illegitimate, the 
court examines the decision only to the extent necessary to verify the presence of a 
business decision, disinterestedness and independence, due care, good faith and the 
absence of an abuse of discretion. If these elements are present-and they are 
presumed to be-the court will not second guess the merits of the decision. See 
gemrally DENNIS J. BLOCK m AL., 'I'm BUS- JUDGMENT R w :  FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
CORPObi?% DIRECTORS (4th ed. 1993). 
71. See. e.g. Steele v. bouisville & Nashville R.R.. 323 US. 192 (1944) (holdinst 
instituted by an employee,7* more often the union's role bas been 
as an active player in the e f f~r t  to eliminate unlawful 
employment discrimination in the workplace, any labor unions 
have advocated vociferously for the elimination of sexual 
di~crimination,~~ disability discrimination and fetal protection 
policies.76 
When the union has discriminated, courts do not hesitate to  
impose liability under Title VLL77 Courts also empha 
Title VII not only imposes a duty on unions to avo 
discrimination, but also to eliminate existing 
 practice^.'^ 
not to suggest that unions have resolved the dilemma 
ing to majority needs while still protecting minorities 
or that unions are never guilty of racial discrimination. Yet it ' 
would seem that in light of the severe penalties that can be 
imposed for discriminatory behavior, unions would have little 
incentive to negotiate an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims 
if such an agreement could be considered discriminatory. As 
Samuel Estreicher noted, under current law, an employee 
claiming inadequate union representation may disregard the 
i 
collective bargaining agreement's finality provisions and go 
directly to court.79 Consequently, the union will be forced t o  
defend its decision to negotiate a clause or process a grievance in 
74. See Goorlman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Daniels v. Pipefitters 
Ass'n Local Union, 945 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1991); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers Int'Z 
Union, 778 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
75. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCME 
v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 609 F. 
Supp. 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
76. See International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
77. For example, in Gaodrnan v. Ldens Steel Company, 482 US. 656 (19871, the 
Court held a union liable under Title Vil for its knowing refusal to pursue grievances 
of black members who complained of racial discrimination and harassment by the 
employer. Similarly, in Daniels u. Pip$ttersJAss'n. Local Union No. 597, 945 F.2d 906 
(7th Cir. 1991E, the Court found a-union liable for its back door hiring hall D O ~ ~ C ~ S  
the union will 
mbem to Select a 
for the Ainrtg of Discrinaination Claims 
other objection to the enforce of a union's apeement 
ate its members' statutosy s is that the union only 
waive collective s, such as the right t o  
ual rights, such as the 
the airing of a Title VII discrimination 
urth Circuit stated that the union's 
and other rights protected by 
exchange the right to a forum 
he Fourth Circuit 
ation of the union as their 
on to bargain all terms and 
conditions of em ent, including agreements to arbitrate 
employee's statutory claims. Since the employees voluntarily 
elect the union, the court reasoned, the agreement to arbitrate 
laims is also voluntary and, therefore, enforceable. 
ssent, a labor union cannot waive a 
cia1 forum for a statutory claim because 
that right belongs to the i n d i ~ i d u a l . ~ ~  According to the dissent, 
the; power to waive collective rights does not include the power to 
waive individual onesS8" The supposition underlying the dissent's 
position in Austin and the Court's position in Gardner-Denver is 
that a union's agreement with the employer to  arbitrate 
individual employees' statuto laims is invalid because the 
is not offered the o tunity to waive his right to a 
other words, only individual can waive forum 
rejected only once outside the securities ind~s t ry . '~  
Supporters of Gardner-Denver argue that it is the ability of 
khe employee to refuse c agreement that makes his waiver 
meanindul. Interestin , the choices presented to the 
represented employee are remarkably similar to those presented 
to the "Cilmes erny>loyee," Once an employee becomes aware tha t  
the union and the employer have apeed to arbitrate employees' 
statutory claims, the emplayee has the following options: abide 
by the union's a eernenf; or look for another job. This is the 
identical dilemma unrepresented employees face. Yet the basis 
85. Martin Matin identifies this issue as the single most important reason why 
Gilmer does not compel reeminatjion of Oardner-Denver. According ta Malin, however 
meaningless a 'Gilmer employee's" waiver is, the opportunity to reject the waiver 
provides the "Qlmer employee'" the ability to "negotiatle] a separate deal with [his] 
employer which did not requirt? arbitration." Malin, supra note 15. By contrast, a 
'&~drur-Denuer" employee has no such "choice". Unionized employees do not have the 
ability to negotiate separate deals with employers. See id. 
86. There is always the possibility, however miniscule, that the employee could 
negotiate with the employer to eliminate the clause. In reality, these clauses are 
presented on n take-it-or-leave-it basis, Even highly skilled employees are unable to 
negotiate the elimination of these clauses. This controversial policy is currently being 
reexamined by the NMQ, See Patrick Mchehan, Big Panel is  Formed by NALSD, 
WALL ST. J., May 29, 1991, at C-1. Possible recommendations include leaving the 
arbitration mquirement alone or making it optional. See id. at  (2-3. 
87. See Prudential Ins. Co, of America v. Lai, 42 F-3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(refusing to enfom agreement to arbitra& statutory claims because the employees did 
not; "knowin&" agree to arbitrate). 
es: to csntiirkue 
r attempts to draw 
using the nievance arbitr 
derogating its minority members' interests in favor of majority 
us.tlfication for ignori e parties' wish to 
resolve statuto putes in arbitration. the represented 
have the option to an arbitration 
ove troublesome since all employees are 
e: take the agreement or leave the job. 
Since the bases for Gard nver have eroded over time, it 
should be overruled. As en shown above, none of the 
reasons Gilmer cited in opposition to the use of predispute 
agreements to arbitrate statutory rights are valid concerns in 
the union setting. 
6. Arbitrators Are Authorized to Utilize External Law When 
Interpreting the Collectiue Bargaining Agreement if the Parties 
In Gurdner-Denver, the Court emphasized that when an 
employee submits his grievance to a'rbitration, he seeks to 
vindicate his contractual rights, not his statutory rights.ss 
According to the Court, statutory rights are independent of the 
contract, and must be adjudicated separately even if they arise 
R 61997 
from the same crucial ts note that 
while the Gar 
expressly require statutov claims to be arbitrated. As a result, 
increasingly common to see parties ageeing to arbihate 
statutory disp~tes.~'  In these agreements, the parties agree tha t  
the arbitrator will apply ""eternal law9'-the same law a court 
ply were i t  resolving the dispute, As a result, 
me more comiFort;able interpreting and 
other antidiscrimination statutes." Thus, 
it is no longer true that grievance arbitratian is a forum sole 
for the resolution af contrac 
It is essential for parties who wish to resolve their disputes 
using external law to make that inten r in the language 
of the calilective bargaining ageement. the parties choose 
to incorporate external law into their ent, the arbitrator 
is required to interpret and apply that l a ~ . ~ V h i s  was true eve 
in the days of Gardner-Denver, h the absence of a state 
inhntion, an arbitrator should reject external law because his 
principal task is to interpret and apply the terns of the contrace, 
Xf it i s  not clear that the parties wish to use external law to 
the dispute, the arbitrator wil be prohibited from using 
it. 
ropriety of using external law to 
external law to r 
decided to leave t 
law should be u 
SkeEworkers u. 
an arbitrator c 
,& the same time, it e that an arbitrator must still 
look to the collective g agreement and draw the 
94, A broadly drawn provision does not specify whether a n  arbitrator should 
util~ze external law in resolving disputes. A more narrowly drawn clause indicates 
whether the arbitrator should use external law. See FWK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER 
EtlcaUM, HOW AR~~~RATION W RKS 382-83 (4th ed. 1985). 
95. Even in cases with broadly drafted arbitration clause, a "significantly greater 
number of arbitrators" resolving claims of discrimination "have considered Titie VII 
dwtfine in deciding" such cases. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 94, a t  382. In 
interpreting an agreement's prohibition against "discrimination as to age, sex, marital 
status, race, color, creed, national origin or political affiliation," id. at  383, Arbitrator 
Rournell indicated that where the agreement fails to define discrimination 
one must look to the law as  it  is being developed under applicable statutes 
by the courts of the land for a definition. When the parties use a phrase such 
as  'discrimination as  to . . . creed,' they presumably are incorporating the 
applicable law on that subject into their contract. As to the issue of religious 
discrimination in employment, the law is set forth in Title VTI. 
Id, 
96.. 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960). 
97, Id. a t  597. 
98. Id. a t  597-98. 
e parties may go eve 
basis for disturbing the parties' ageement.'05 
1. The Cornpatly and the Union will comply with all laws preventing 
discrinkination against Any employee because of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, handicap or veteran status. 
2. This Contract shall be administered in accordance with the applicable 
provisions of the h e d e a n s  with Disabilities Act. . . . 
3. Any disputes under this Article . . . shall be subject to the grievance 
procedure. 
Id. at 879-80. 
100. k4 Zack RC Blmh emphasize, "[ilf . . . the parties have chosen to incorporate 
external law Into t-heir agreement, the arbitrator must interpret and apply that law." 
ZACM C Ihoew, ?rupra note 83, at  28-29. 
101. 78 F.3d at 875. 
102. See idiclr, a t  880-81. 
103. In Cole w. Burns hternational Security Seroicas, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir, 
19971, the D.C. Circuit suggested that when parties explicitly authorize an arbitrator 
to resolve a dispute using a statute, public law is only 'relevant to determining what 
contractual rights the parties enjoy." Id, at 1475. According to Cole, adjudication of a 
statutory dispute ie  an implementation of the contract, not a resolution of the statutory 
claim. This view is extremely f a m d l t i c .  If a labor arbitrator is requested to resolve 
an employee's Title VXK cldm, his interpretation necessarily resolves both the 
contradud issue and the statutory one. No purpose is served by permitting relitigation 
of the atntutmy claim in a subsequent federal court proceeding. In the absence of any 
evidence that arbitrators did not understand the law they were to interpret, i t  is 
senseless to provide the employee with an opportunity to relitigate the same issues. 
104. See Alexander v. Gmdner-Denver. 415 U.S. 36. 50 (1974). 
ection to a n  arbitrator using 

evision of 
decision to select a particular arbitrator should be respected. 
oval of the use of arbitrators to resolve 
ims, together vvith the arbitratorsy proven. 
experience in decidi such daims, leaves little basis for " 
irrvalidating an arbi on agreement on the basis that the 
arbitrator is unqualified to decide these issues. The argument 
that arbitrators are qualified t o  decide statutory disputes is 
pelfing in the employment discrimination context, 
where cases most often turn on factual. not legal  issue^."^ Thus, 
in employment cases, the effect on the underlying dispute of an. 
arbitrator's misunderstanding of the statute is minimized. In " 
addition, judliciali review of  the legal issues is always possible.111 
 dispute^ and that  arbitrators are capable of resolving them despite the parties' limited 
access to judicial review following an arbitral decision. 
After studying 'thousands" of arbitration opinions, the Elkouris conclude that 
arbitrators are not only capable of understanding and applying external law, but that a 
"this capability probably equals mdl sometimes exceeds that of many courts, including 
some federal courts." id. 
109. AMERICAN k ~ r n ~ t o l u  ASS'N, EWWYMENT D I S P ~  RESOLIPTION RULES 9 &(a) 
, (19931, available m 1993 WL 592205. 
110. See MaXin, supra note 15, at 104 ('Most employment disputes are fact-based 
and not likely to raise the kind of legal issues that would call for significant judiciat 
review."). A study conducted in the 1980s found that discrimination claims involve 
factual issues eighty-four percent of the time. See Noyman & Stallworth, supra note 
26, a t  49, 53. 
111. The standard for judicial review of grievance arbitration decisions is quite 
deferential. See U&ed Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Gorp., 363 U.S. 593, 
699 (1960). Yet this deference is not unlimited. According to Enterprise Wheel, "[wlhen 
the arbitrator's, words manifest an infidelity to  this obligation [to interpret the 
collective bargaining agreement], courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of 
the award." Id. at 597. While this standard does not provide much opportunity for 
review of an arbitrator's decision, in its language and intent it  is quite similar to the 
FAA's deferential standard for judicial review. The FAA permits reversal of the 
arbitrator's award when the arbitrator has shown manifest disregard of the law or has 
engaged in some type of egregious misconduct demonstrating fraud, corruption or 
partiality. See 9 U.S.C. fi 10(a)(l)-f5) (1994). When the parties have agreed to resolve i 
I 
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In evaluating the ilmer decision, commentators have found 
rbing the Court's emphatic rejection of 
the existence of unequal bargaining es between an 
invalid.'12 The Court stated that while vallidilcgr of consent can be 
examined on a case-by-case basis, only agreements that are the 
result of fraud o venvhelming economic advantage would be 
unmfurceable. 'I3 spite the Gilmer Court's forceful statement 
on the matter, the question of whether unequal bargaining 
wer should invalidate an a eement to arbitrate statutory 
ims has remained unsettled. 
of continuing impost;ance because of 
unceasing calls for ner's reversal on the basis th 
agreements to ar te are unfair to employees. 
basis for arguing 'GCElrner agreements" should be rejected is 
ed into voluntarily. Voluntariness in this 
hemism for unequal bargaining power. 
e agreements are not voluntary because 
the employee confronted with the agreement has no ability to 
reject it or negotiate its terms.''* The employee's inability to 
make a legitimate choice stems from the fact that the agreement 
their disputes using external law in the collective bargaining context, the standard of 
review of the arbitrator's award would look remarkably similar. The main inquiry 
would be  whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the applicable external law. 
Gdmer declared that the IiMs system of judicial review was sufficiently protective of 
employee's statutory rights. Thus, it  would seem logical to hold that the Enterprise 
Whel's system of judicial review is equally appropriate for review of statutory disputes 
resolved in grievance arbitration. 
112. See, e.g., Christine 6. Cooper, Where Are We Ooing With Gilmerf-Some 
Rwntnutbm on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
203, 220-21 (1992); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131, 153 
(1996). 
113. See Gilmer v. Znterstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (citing 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chryder-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U S .  614, 627 (1985)). 
114. See 140 CONG. REc. 54266-03 (1994) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (attacking 
predispute arbitration agreements because they are mandatory, as opposed to 
voluntary); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F,3d 1299, 1299 (9th Cir. 
1994) (requiring "knowing and voluntary" consent before enforcement of executory 
arbitration agreement); Sternlight, supra note 6, at 637. Some commentators reject the 
theory that predispute arbitration agreements are not voluntary. According to Professor 
Stephea Ware, for instance, such agreements are voluntary because the employee can 
always choose not to accept the position. See Ware, w p m  note 3. 
is prpreseglted on a take-iGor-leave-it basis, 
arises: if Gilmer 
to a collective bargaining ageem 
agreement" and serves to explain why the perceived unfairness 
of the "Gilrner a eement" is not present in cases invoking 
''Gardner-Denver agreements," 
Arbitration of public law issues in a nonunion setting is 
troubling because the structural protections inherent in 
collective bargaining are not pre~ent."~ Unlike interactions in 
the collective bargaining context, in which both the employer an  
the union are regular participants in miegstiatian and arbitration, 
only the employer is a "repeat playcr"ll' in individual 1 
amployment arbitration, employee, by contrast, is a one-shot 
analysis of the interactions between one-shotters 
and repeat players demonstrates that repeat players have a 
r-Employee Negotiations 
The repeat player's s e a t e r  experience, expertise and 
sophistication in contract negotiation will provide it sipificant 
advantages in inte shot players. For instance, 
in the dispute resol repeat player is likely to 
ave a much better Landing of the risks and benefits of 
ous dispute on mechanisms. Through this 
mderstanding, the player may be able to choose the 
dispute resolution m that best favors both parties, or 
one that is more favorable to it.''' A one-shot player, by contrast, 
will be unable t o  waliuate intelligently the proposed clause, 
because of a lack of experience in dispute resolution and 
inadequate resources to investigate the benefits and drawbacks 
of the clause. 
The repeat player may also enjoy significant benefits during 
the dispute resolution process. A greater understanding of the 
process and an ability to influence that process through repeated 
informal relations with the de er provides the repeat 
&yes notable advantages. , the repeat player's 
institutional memory will lead to more informed choices in 
selecting an arbi t ra t~r ,"~ The one-shot player will not have a 
similar ability to influence the arbitrator and cannot afford to 
keep track of different arbitrators' decisions. 
Finally, the repeat player may benefit from the fact that one- 
shot players, such as employees, tend t o  value improperly the 
tat bias as a result of 
of the arbitration ta~eement because of their greater experience 
and superior knowledge, as well as in the selection of the 
arbitrator m d  in the 
I .  Arbitration agreement negotiation 
f repeat playera use contracts in their negotiations with one- 
plnycsrs, they will attempt to maximize profits and benefits 
ies of scale by using standardized 
rtunity for negotiation of terms. 
with a standardized ement, a one-shot player can only 
attempt to gain conce s on the negotiable terms if he fully 
appreciates the dis or costs arising from the 
nonnegotiable porkion ement. To appreciate the value 
ployee would need to read and 
oposed ageementaa3 Yet the rational 
employee will not invest substantial resources in reading or 
analyzing a proposed agreement. Such behavior is rational 
because the expected benefits from undertaking such an 
122. Judgmental bias causes people to misassess the likelihood that a law 
investigaGon wou 
associated with s 
be reduced even 
ntrast, a rational repeat player will have included the 
employment agreement in a way that furnishes it the most 
advantage.126 Moreover, the rational employer's position is 
further enhanced by its ability to present the arbitration 
124. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 241-43 (1995). Eisenberg explains that rational form readers will 
remain ignorant of the terms because the cost of evaluating them is  a waste of 
resources and the likelihood of the clause's relevance is low. See id, Perhaps more 
impohntty, workers simply have other things on their minds. As one author put it, 
"Lpeople want to eat first and consider legal and philosophical implications later.'" 
Jeffrey W, Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1387 
(1991) (quoting 2 Brecht, Dreigroschenoper [The T h e e  Penny Opera], in GESAMMELTE 
WERKE: SWKE Kollected Works1 457 (1967)). 
'd Charny, Nonlegal 
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agreement on a 
understands the 
X 
the arbitration proceedings. The bias resu 
precedent system for tracking arbitration decisions, 
2. knteruction with the arbitrator 
An individual us arbitration to resolve disputes has the 
incentive to compile rmation about potential arbitrators and 
sions and develop a onship with those 
former will allow bette ictability of arbitral 
outcomes. The latter will potentiaUy the individual to 
influence the ouakome of the arbitratio employer's position 
as a repeat player enables it to accomplish both of these goals. , 
It makes economic sense for the repeat player to monitor 
arbitrators' decisions and acquire advance intelligence about 
each arbitrator because it is likely that it will use that 
information repeatedly in the future. Not sumrisingly, it i s  
common for large or izations and law firms that represent + 
those organizations keep databases containin 
background information an each potential arbitrabr, including 
how the arbitrator ruled in a number of cases, as well as the 
quality of his decision,128 
For the same reason, the repeat player will take the. 
opportunity to develop kcilitative informal relations with the i 
V 
127. See Cole v. Burns Int? Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Lewis 
Maltby, Paradise hsF: How the Gilmer Court &st the opportunity for Alternative 
i 
Dispute Re.wtutian to Improue Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hm. RTS, 1, 4-5 (1994). 
128. One large, management-side, labor law firm in Chicago maintains a database 
that utndicat& whether an arbitrator found in favor of management or union, describes 
the issue in dispute and offem the participating attorney's opinion regarding the quality a 
of the decision. Other resources containing infomation about arbitrators exist. The 
Labor Arbltrat;ion Information Senrice (LAIS) provides information regarding an 
arbitrator's past decisions, including the percentage of times the arbitrator has found 
ia. favor of management and the union. The LAIS also indicates the arbl t ratds  
percentages in discipline and nondiscipline cases and then considers the arbitrator's 




he structure of the current arbitrator selection system does 
nate the one-shot ployeek disadvantages, Quite to 
provides significant benefits to 
the employer, at  the e e of the employee, 
likely to, feel pressure d in favor of the 
ecause industry members will more 
arbitrator. In addition, in many 
employer pays the arbitrator's 
e employer "owns" the process as 
itrator's ultimate resolution of the 
4 
129. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Lirnzts of &gal Chance, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 110-12 (1974). 
130. Although potential pldntiEs would be acting irrationally if they attempted to 
obtain similar Information, the question is why a business or Iaw firm has failed to 
develop similar databases for plaintiffs' use. The response is simply that it would be 
3 ocoarrmieally ineEcient to expend the kind of resources necessary Q obtain such 
mfomation unless there was some assurance that plaintiffs would choose to pay the 
collector of the information for use of that  Information. In other words, a s  long a s  a 
business or law firm would have no assurance that they would receive a return on 
their investment, it would be irrational for them to compile such a resource. Employers 
and their law firms, on the,other hand, do have a n  incentive to compile such 
hfomation because a large employer will typically hire one law firm to handle all of 
i its employment lawsuits. 
Similarly, there is little incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to collect and maintain a 
V database containing information about arbitrators. While such information would make 
a plaintiff's lawyer more marketable and would allow him to increase his fees if the 
infarmation made her more successful, an investment in that infomation might not be 
fruitful because employees are one-shot players in the legal hiring world just a s  they 
/ are in the dispute resolution world. 
131. See Tia Schneider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace 
Dispute Resolver, 49 DISP. RESOL. J. 48, 50 (1994)" In a recent case, the 13.6. Circuit 
a held that i t  is preferable to have employers pay for the entire process. See Cole, 105 
F,3d 1465. The Cole court suggested that Gilmer might not have approved a program 
of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the "absence of an agreement to pay 
mbitratars' fees." Id. a t  1484. Moreover, the Cole court rejected the theory that a 
repeat player has the ability, if it pays for the process, to control it. The Cote court 
stated, "[ilt is doubtful that arbitrators care about who pays them, so long a s  they are 
paid for their services." Id. 
8 
be sure that the 
rehire her in $he future. 1 
Thus, the employer main 
th the Repeat Player: 
As the D.C. Circuit recently acknowledged, arbitration in the 
collective context is not as troubling as arbitration 
between and inclividuall employees because the 9 
structure of the negotiation and arbitral process does not confer 
benefits on one party a t  the expense of the other.'" In  union- 
management re ations, both parties are frequent participants, or 
"repeat players" in negotiation and arbitration. 
e arbitration agreement 
3 
The dynamics of the relationship between two repeat players 
temper many of the defects present in the relationship between i 
132. Unrepresented employees suffer from an additional disadvantage: judgmental 
bias. Judgmental bias causes individuals to misperceive the likelihood that  an event 
that rarely occw md that they have never experienced will occur again in the future. 
See Slovic et al., supm no& 122, a t  468. 'Phis bias, together with most people's belief i 
that they are immune from hazards, results in an inability to perceive accurately t h e  
likelihood that a low probabiiitv event will occur. See id. 
Xn repeat ~jlayer 
lar experience and 
ion. Economies of 
to apportion fairly the agreement's surplus. 
The drafting party creates the agree ent with the 
negotiator will review it. As a 
first draft is aware that drafting 
agreement may result in the kin 
teXy trigger the relationship's demise. 
Ftlrther, even elf-serving behavior went undetected 
initially, the self-seming party would have difficulty dealing with 
the other party 9; out the life of the agreement and would 
certainly face tou in subsequent negotiations. 'rhus, 
in drafting an agreemen another repeat player, the drafter 
has the proper incentives both to draft an eEcient contract, and 
to distribute equitably the economic benefits. 
In game theory terms, the strategy that motivates a repeat 
player engaged in continued interactions with other repeat 
players to avoid overreaching is the game of "tit for tat.'"% Using 
the "tit for tat" strategy, a party's optimal strategy is to 
cooperating and continue to cooperate as long as one's 
does, If one's opponent engages in an act of betrayal, the affected 
party should retaliate. This strategy discourages noncooperative 
behavior while permitting a pattern of mutual cooperation to 
develop. Thus, "tit for tat" is the best strategy in a repeat-move 
game involving repeat p 1 a ~ e r s . l ~ ~  
Applying this theory to the union-management relationship 
yields predictable results. First, the union is a repository of 
UMG IJN 
of the ageement or during the next round of negotiations. 
1 
P 
'korrect" resolution of the dispute. In most repeat player 
s the preferred method of dispute resolution is 
arbitration. 
3 2. Dispute resolution between repeat players 
player.13' According tcr 
ecause parties can eusto 
interests, mbitration also has 
acceptable result at a low cost. 
wealth transfers 
resources rather 
equalized over the long run and that erroneous awards can be 
dealt with through negotiation, all have contributed to the 
common labor-relations practi of routinely obeying awards, 
even those that the losing s considers er rone~us ."~~l  The 
method for dealing with awards that are perceived to be unfair 
to the union or the employer is not reprisal or disobedience, both 
of which might cause negotiation difficulties in the future, but 
rather simply the decision not to hire the offending arbitrator 
again in the future. 
dispute resolation and will 
constituents, the employees. n i s  in a much better 
are contractual or statutory. 
CONCLUSION 
Predispute arbitration ageements betweon employers and 
employees are unquestionably enforceable following Gilrner u, 
nson Lane Corporation, 
Court has been reluctant to enforce si 
unionized workplace, citing Alexander u. Gardner-Denver, for the 
proposition that such agreements are not enforceable. 
Over the past twenty years, however, the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts have articulated an increasingly favorable 
attitude toward the use of arbitration to resolve statutory 
disputes. Tho Court has also repeatedly announced that the 
arbitral forum is a perfectly adequate venue for the resolution of 
statutory rights, This new vision of arbitration, when considered 
in conjunction with the erosion of Cfardner-Denver's foundation, 
mandates a re-evaluation and reversal of Gardner-Denver. A 
number of lower courts have already begun the movement, 
placing collectively-bargained agreements to resolve statutory 
disputes using external antidiscrimination laws on equal footing 
with "Gilrner agreements." While some differences between the 
eemcsnts remain, these are distinctions without a 
difference that should be acknowledged as such and rejected. 
Furthermore, even if Cilnzer were ultimately overruled or 
unfair, Gardner- 

